Brackeen v. Zinke by Tinker, Bradley E.
Public Land & Resources Law Review
Volume 0 Case Summaries 2018-2019
Brackeen v. Zinke
Bradley E. Tinker
University of Montana, bradley.tinker@umontana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/plrlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Cultural Heritage Law
Commons, Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, Indigenous Studies Commons, Law and Race
Commons, Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, and the Sociology
Commons
This Case Summary is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Public
Land & Resources Law Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
Tinker, Bradley E. (2018) "Brackeen v. Zinke," Public Land & Resources Law Review: Vol. 0 , Article 14.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/plrlr/vol0/iss9/14
Brackeen v. Zinke, ___F. Supp. 3d___, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173115, 
2018 WL 4927908 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2018) 
 
Bradley E. Tinker 
 
In 1978, Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act to counter 
practices of removing Indian children from their homes, and to ensure the 
continued existence of Indian tribes through their children. The law 
created a framework establishing how Indian children are adopted as a way 
to protect those children and their relationship with their tribe. ICWA also 
established federal standards for Indian children being placed into non-
Indian adoptive homes. Brackeen v. Zinke made an important distinction 
for the placement preferences of the Indian children adopted by non-Indian 
plaintiffs; rather than viewing the placement preferences in ICWA as 
based upon Indians’ political classification, the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Texas viewed the preferences as based 
upon a racial classification, to which strict scrutiny applies. The court 
concluded that ICWA was unconstitutional, potentially opening the door 
to allow the same abusive practices to resurface in regard to removal and 
adoption of Indian children. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Brackeen v. Zinke centers around the Indian Child Welfare Act 
(“ICWA”), a statutory scheme passed in 1978, in response to a crisis of 
Indian children being separated from their Indian families by child welfare 
and adoption agencies.1 ICWA created a framework for how children are 
removed from their Indian families, and the procedures to be used in 
adoptions involving Indian children.2 States’ receipt of child welfare 
funding is contingent upon compliance with the ICWA framework.3  
Several parties comprise the plaintiffs in this case, including the 
states of Texas, Louisiana, and Indiana (collectively, “State Plaintiffs”), 
whose compliance with ICWA is mandated, and several individual non-
Indian families and persons— the Brackeens, the Librettis, the Cliffords, 
and Ms. Hernandez (collectively, “Individual Plaintiffs”) (together with 
the State Plaintiffs, “Plaintiffs”)— who were in the process of adopting 
Indian children.4 Plaintiffs motioned for summary judgment on their 
claims contesting the constitutionality of ICWA.5 In addition, Plaintiffs 
challenged a Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) regulation passed to 
                                                     
 
1. Brackeen v. Zinke, ___F. Supp. 3d___, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
173115, 2018 WL 4927908 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2018).  
2. Id. at *2 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1901, et seq.(2012)). 
3. Id. at *3. 
4. Id. at *1.  
5. Id.   
2 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol. 0 
 
implement statutory provisions of ICWA (“Final Rule”), claiming it 
violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).6  
Numerous parties defended against Plaintiffs’ claims, including 
the United States, the Department of the Interior (“DOI”), the DOI 
Secretary, the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), the 
HHS Secretary, the BIA, and the BIA Director and Principal Assistant 
Secretary for Indian Affairs (collectively, “Federal Defendants”),  and four 
Indian tribes—the Cherokee Nation, the Oneida Nation, the Quinalt Indian 
Nation, and the Morengo Band of Mission Indians, (collectively, “Tribal 
Defendants”) (together with the Federal Defendants, “Defendants”).7 The 
Defendants based their arguments on the holding in Morton v. Mancari,8 
and contended that the classification used to identify the Indian children 
under ICWA was politically, not racially, based.9 The Federal Defendants 
also argued the constitutional authority vested in ICWA permissibly 
comes from the Indian Commerce Clause, and that the Final Rule 
promulgated by BIA was owed deference from the court.10 
The court ultimately granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ 
summary judgment motion, holding ICWA violated equal protection 
principles, the anti-commandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment, 
and the non-delegation doctrine of Article I.11 As to the administrative law 
claims, the court declared BIA was not entitled to deference for its Final 
Rule interpreting ICWA, and BIA violated the APA by exceeding its 
statutory authority.12 However, the court declined to grant summary 
judgment on Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment due process claim.13 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
A. ICWA Framework 
 
“Th[e] framework [of ICWA] establishes: (1) placement 
preferences in adoptions of Indian children; (2) good cause to depart from 
those placement preferences; (3) standards and responsibilities for state 
courts and their agents; and (4) consequences flowing from 
noncompliance with the statutory requirements.”14 “[P]lacement 
preferences in foster care, preadoptive, and adoptive proceedings 
involving Indian children” are mandated by ICWA,  and without good 
cause to deviate from those preferences, the following hierarchy must be 
observed in adoptive placements: “(1) a member of the child’s extended 
                                                     
 
6. Id. at *2. 
7. Id. at *1.  
8. 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
9. Brackeen, 2018 WL at *11.  
10. Id. at *17.  
11. Id. at *14, *15, *18. 
12. Id. at *18, *22. 
13. Id. at *22. 
14. Id. at *2 (see 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). 
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family; (2) other members of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian 
families.”15 For two years after non-Indians successfully petition for 
adoption of an Indian child, that adoption may still be collaterally attacked 
under ICWA.16 A strict notification process must be followed in matters 
involving Indian children, the structure of which is determined by the type 
of proceeding at hand.17  
 
B. Final Rule 
 
Accompanying regulations to ICWA—the Indian Child Welfare 
Act Proceedings (“Final Rule”)—were promulgated and officially passed 
by BIA in 2016 to provide minimum standards to parties involved in 
implementing the requirements of ICWA. The Final Rule represented a 
transition from a 1979 guideline, and commanded that “[t]he party urging 
that the ICWA preferences not be followed bears the burden of proving by 
clear and convincing evidence of good cause” to deviate from the child 
placement hierarchy.18  
BIA also provided courts with five factors to consider when 
evaluating whether the “good cause exception” has been met.19 Placement 
preferences may be circumvented if adopters prove the child’s best interest 
lies outside those preferences.20 The Final Rule changed the 1979 
guidelines from a suggested course of action for courts to binding 
regulation, forcing courts to interpret the good cause exception as “narrow 
and limited in scope.”21 
 
C. The Adoption Proceedings 
 
The Brackeens, one of the families making up Individual 
Plaintiffs, argued they had good cause to adopt an Indian child, and were 
thus entitled to circumvent the placement preferences of ICWA.22 
Ultimately, the Indian tribes of the child’s biological parents did not 
intervene with the final adoption proceedings and the Brackeens’ adoption 
was completed.23 The second family, the Librettis, together with another 
Indian child’s biological mother, Ms. Hernandez, agreed to a settlement 
                                                     
 
15. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)). 
16. Id. at *3.  
17. Id. at *3; See 25 U.S.C. § 1912. 
18. Id. at *3.  
19. Id. (citing Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 
38,838, 39,839 (June 14, 2016)). These five factors include the request of parents, the 
request of the child, sibling attachment, the extraordinary physical, mental, or 
emotional needs of the child, and the unavailability of a suitable preferred placement. 
FR § 23.132(c).  
20. Id. at *2. 
21. Id. at *4 (quoting Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 
at 38,839). 
22. Id. at *7.  
23. Id.   
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with her tribe for the adoption of the child.24 The third family, the 
Cliffords, fostered an Indian child and were attempting to adopt when the 
child was removed and preferentially placed with their biological 
grandmother.25 The placement was against the consent of the family and 
without the support of the child’s guardian ad litem, and the child remained 
separated from the Cliffords.26 The Individual Plaintiffs’ adoptions were 
considered “successful.”27 However, under ICWA, the adoptions 
remained subject to collateral attack for up to two years.28 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
The court addressed six principal issues: (1) whether ICWA 
violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection requirements; (2) 
whether ICWA’s delegation of congressional enforcement power to Indian 
tribes violated Article I of the U.S. Constitution; (3) whether ICWA, 
together with the Final Rule, violated the anti-commandeering doctrine of 
the Tenth Amendment; (4) whether the Final Rule violated the APA; (5) 
whether ICWA violated the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause; and 
(6) whether the scope of the Indian Commerce Clause limited Congress’ 
authority to pass certain provisions in ICWA.29  
 
A. Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Claim 
 
The court first addressed Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment equal 
protection claim.30 Plaintiffs argued that certain sections of ICWA violated 
the Fifth Amendment because those sections relied upon racial 
classifications, thereby subjecting reviews under ICWA to strict 
scrutiny.31 Because ICWA subscribes certain rules where the child in a 
placement proceeding is Indian, Plaintiffs argued the law makes a race-
based distinction that is unconstitutional unless the government can 
provide a compelling, narrowly tailored interest justifying the statute’s 
existence.32 Conversely, Defendants argued that ICWA’s child placement 
requirements classified Indian children based on their political category, 
as permitted by Morton v. Mancari,33 and reviews of political class-based 
distinctions should receive the more easily satisfied rational basis 
scrutiny.34   
                                                     
 
24. Id.  
25. Id.  
26. Id.   
27. Id.   
28. Id.   
29. Id. at *2.  
30. Id. at *10.  
31. Id.   
32. Id. at *11.  
33. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).  
34. Brackeen, 2018 WL at *11.   
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ICWA “defines an Indian child as one who is a member ‘of an 
Indian tribe’ as well as those children simply eligible for membership who 
have a biological Indian parent.”35 Because ICWA does not rely solely on 
actual tribal membership, but also includes those children who are eligible 
to become tribal members, the court felt the facts in the case closely 
resembled those in Rice v. Cayetano,36 and should be examined using strict 
scrutiny.37 Due to  the Federal Defendants failure to detail the 
governmental interests served by ICWA, the court found ICWA’s 
application of a blanket placement preference to any Indian, regardless of 
tribal membership, did not survive strict scrutiny analysis.38 As such, the 
court held that the placement preferences within ICWA were 
unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection requirements of 
the Fifth Amendment.39 
 
B. Article I Non-Delegation Claim 
 
The non-delegation doctrine determines how and to whom 
congressional power may be given.40 The State Plaintiffs argued that 
Congress’ delegation of power to Indian tribes under ICWA was a 
violation of constitutional authority.41 Congress may grant federal 
agencies regulatory power to execute law, but may not “plainly delegate” 
congressional authority to create legislation.42 Through ICWA, Congress 
granted Indian tribes the power to modify legislative placement 
preferences, in favor of the tribes’ own preferences.43 The court applied 
the intelligible principle test to determine if Congress’ delegation authority 
to Indian tribes under ICWA was proper.44 The court ultimately held that 
the power delegated to Indian tribes in ICWA violated the non-delegation 
doctrine because the power was legislative in nature.45 However, the court 
found that even if the structure of the delegation was proper, Indian tribes 
did not qualify as a federal branch of government, and were therefore 
unqualified to receive congressional delegations.46 Accordingly, the court 
                                                     
 
35. Id. at *12 (emphasis in original). 
36. 528 U.S. at 519. 
37. Brackeen, 2018 WL at *12. The court failed to expand upon certain 
facts in from Rice, including that the case involved Native Hawaiian tribes which are 
not federally recognized. The court still distinguished the facts in Brackeen from those 
in Mancari, where preference was permissibly given to Indian applicants of the BIA. 
See id. 
38. Id. at *13. 
39. Id. at *14. 
40. Id.   
41. Id.  
42. Id. 
43. Id. at *15 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c)). 
44. Id. at *14. 
45. Id. at *15.  
46. Id.  
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ruled Congress’ delegation under ICWA, and the accompanying Final 
Rule, were unconstitutional under Article I of the constitution.47 
 
C. Tenth Amendment Anti-Commandeering Claim 
 
Plaintiffs also challenged provisions of ICWA as unconstitutional 
under the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering doctrine.48 “The anti-
commandeering principle ‘is simply the expression of a fundamental 
[Constitutional] structural decision . . . to withhold from Congress the 
power to issue orders directly to the states.’”49 In its analysis, the court 
relied upon Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association.50 In 
Murphy, the U.S. Supreme Court provided three principles outlining the 
importance of the anti-commandeering doctrine: (1) “it is ‘one of the 
Constitution’s structural protections of liberty’”; (2) it “promotes political 
accountability”; and (3) “it ‘prevents Congress from shifting the costs of 
regulation to the States.’”51 
The court held ICWA violated all three of the Murphy principles 
by “commanding States to impose federal standards in state causes of 
action,” by the “blurred” responsibility the public could perceive between 
state courts “responsible for federally-mandated standards,” and by the 
cost-shifting burden placed on states enforcing ICWA.52 Defendants’ 
arguments against a Tenth Amendment violation—based on the Indian 
Commerce Clause and principles of state law preemption—proved 
unpersuasive.53 According to the court, ICWA’s infringements upon 
States ultimately constituted commandeering because “Congress shift[ed] 
all responsibility to the States, yet ‘unequivocally dictate[d]’ what they 
must do.’”54  
 
D. Administrative Procedure Act Claims 
 
Plaintiffs also argued that the Final Rule violated the APA by: “(1) 
purport[ing] to implement an unconstitutional law”; “(2) exceed[ing] the 
scope of [DOI]’s statutory regulatory authority under the ICWA; (3) 
reflect[ing] an impermissibly ambiguous construction of the statutes”; and 
(4) being “otherwise arbitrary and capricious.”55 Because the court granted 
the other motions for summary judgment, the corresponding sections of 
                                                     
 
47. Id. (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
48. Id. at *15. 
49. Id. at *16. 
50. 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
51. Id.; Brackeen, 2018 WL at *17.  
52. Id.  
53. Id. at *18.  
54. Id.   
55. Id.  
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the challenged Final Rule were set aside after examining the language of 
the APA.56  
State Plaintiffs argued the Final Rule mandated state courts and 
agencies to employ certain placement preferences without regard to the 
child’s best interest, and was beyond the scope of the statutory authority 
possessed by BIA.57 Finally, Defendants attempted to counter Plaintiffs’ 
arguments by urging the court to apply Chevron deference, therein 
upholding the Final Rule.58 Defendants argued BIA introduced the Final 
Rule in 2016 so states would uniformly comply with ICWA in a manner 
“consistent with the Act’s express language.”59 The court declined to 
afford Defendants with Chevron deference because the Final Rule 
unnecessarily changed earlier guidelines into binding regulation, and was 
therefore beyond the statutory authority granted by Congress to implement 
and enforce provisions of ICWA.60 For these reasons the court granted 
summary judgment for Plaintiffs on their APA claims.61 
 
E. Fifth Amendment Due Process and Indian Commerce Clause Claims 
 
Individual Plaintiffs also claimed a Fifth Amendment violation 
under the due process clause because ICWA inhibited their abilities as 
foster families to make fundamental decisions about the “care, custody, 
and control of their children.”62 The court held that this fundamental right 
had never been extended to foster families, and denied the motion for 
summary judgment.63 Lastly, Plaintiffs asserted Congress lacked the 
constitutional authority to pass certain substantive portions of ICWA.64 
Defendants argued that the Indian Commerce Clause granted Congress 
plenary power over Indian tribes and thus permitted Congress to pass the 
ICWA provisions in question.65 The court again applied the Murphy 
standard and held that Congress did not have the authority to directly order 
the States in this way.66  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Brackeen v. Zinke ultimately held substantive portions of ICWA 
as unconstitutional. If upheld on appeal, it has major implications for the 
future protection of inherent tribal sovereignty— reduced protections in 
                                                     
 
56. Id. at *20. 
57. Id. at *8.  
58. Id. 
59. Id. at *4 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 23.101).  
60. Id. at *20. 
61. Id.  
62. Id.  
63. Id. 
64. Id.   
65. Id.  
66. Id. (citing Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479). 
8 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol. 0 
 
Indian child adoptions by non-Indian families, the progeny of decisions 
that will follow, and a disregard for the protection of federal Indian law 
norms which protect the unique status enjoyed by Indian people and tribes. 
Without the safeguards of ICWA, the historically rampant injustices 
ICWA was created to prevent could go unchecked once again. 
 
